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Abstract

Analysis of E-mail Attachment Signatures for Potential
use by Intrusion Detection Systems
Archis Vijay Raje

Today, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is almost a necessity. An IDS can protect a
network from external threats, hide system vulnerabilities, prevent misuse, act as a
second layer of defense to the firewall, provide evidence in case of an attack. The
effectiveness of an IDS depends on the number of parameters it can monitor to report
malicious activity. Due to highly variable nature of network traffic, current Intrusion
Detection Systems monitor packet headers only.
This thesis investigates the possibility of monitoring network packet data as one of the
parameters for IDS. This is done by finding a pattern in each type of payload. This
pattern might then be related to the application to which it belongs. Based on this pattern,
an attempt is made to determine if there is a difference in packets generated by different
applications.
This investigation limits the classification to packets generated by E-mail attachments.
Frequency of characters in packet data is used to generate a pattern. This frequency is
limited to Base64 alphabets since E-mail has to conform to RFC 822 standards. Based on
these patterns, certain E-mail attachments can be related to the source type of the attached
file.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Recent developments in information technology have increased our day-to-day
dependence on computers and the Internet. The increased transmission such as personal
financial transactions and sensitive corporate information attracts malicious users to
exploit shortfalls in a system’s security. As people realized that a firewall was not
sufficient to keep the intruders out, new techniques were developed. An Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) is one such attempt.

1.1 Intrusion Detection
The main function of an IDS is to detect and isolate incorrect and anomalous events. Fast
detection and isolation can minimize the damage in case of intrusion. Threats to a
company’s network may be due to malicious activity or vulnerabilities in computer
systems. Because of the constantly evolving technology, it becomes very difficult to
manage such threats. An Intrusion Detection System consists of a set of tools which help
monitor a network’s status and security. In addition to security policy, system auditing,
router security, firewalls and incident response plans, IDS adds to the layered defense of
a network. While a firewall merely allows or blocks traffic based on certain rules, an IDS
tries to isolate specific intrusive traffic that is allowed by the firewall. Each layer is
important for the overall security of a network. Failure of one layer may affect the overall
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defense. Figure 1 shows the location of an Intrusion Detection System within a network.
System vulnerability once past the firewall provides another method for an intruder to
enter the network. Many of these vulnerabilities are either not yet identified and their
impact on system security in unknown. Despite efforts to test a new product for bugs,
there are always some bugs that escape scrutiny and may prove to be harmful. An IDS
may detect an intruder and identify him. An IDS log can also help support an
investigation of how the intrusion took place. Assessment can lead to steps being taken to
prevent future events. Such investigations can also expose vulnerabilities of the network
leading to improved security. An IDS is no longer a luxury but a necessity.

Users

Servers

Internet
IDS
Firewall

Figure 1. Position of IDS in a Network
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1.2 Current IDS techniques
Considerable effort has been expended by the industry to develop a perfect Intrusion
Detection System. There have been many techniques employed to detect intrusions. Each
technique has its own pros and cons. Classification of ID systems is done [1] in the
following ways.
Based on data source:
1. Host based
2. Network based
Based on model of intrusion:
1. Anomaly detection model
2. Misuse detection model

Each system has its own method for data collection and classification [2]. A host based
system collects data from a single source to detect intrusions. This type of a system is
useful in monitoring trusted insider attacks. It can also monitor system calls and can thus
be more efficient, since it can relate the network activity to processes running on the
machine. A network based IDS can monitor an attack which spans multiple hosts. Thus
each system has its advantages and disadvantages.

A network based anomaly IDS uses observed activity on the network to create a baseline
for standard behavior of a network. Given a certain margin for error, the system triggers
an alarm if there is significant deviation from this set activity saying an anomaly exists in
the behavior of the network. The system needs to be trained on the network before it can
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perform the required task. This training provides a baseline for the systems on that
network. Anomalies can then be detected using this baseline as a reference. These
systems in addition can be adaptive as they can adapt to changes in normal behavior over
a period of time.

Network misuse detection checks for activity, which is defined as bad. A description of
undesired usage is made and the network traffic is compared against it. The signatures or
rules correspond to a specific attack or known system vulnerability. A possible attack is
detected if this known signature is found in the payload of a packet [3]. As the name
suggests, this type of IDS checks mainly for internal misuse. A majority of commonly
occurring intrusions can be successfully detected using pattern matching techniques.
Although effective to a certain extent, misuse detection is not suitable for the remainder
of intrusions [4]. Misuse detection for example will not identify newer types of attacks.
Only when a known signature is available, can such systems detect an attack. The
advantage of this technique is that it is fully operational the moment it is deployed.

Anomaly based systems take some time after deployment to learn the network traffic
before they can detect any intrusions. This is one step, which cannot be ignored, as the
system is specific to a given network. Even for two networks having identical
configurations, traffic can have large variations. Hence the system requires a lot of tuning
before it can be deployed effectively.
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Anomalies in network traffic are due to typically four reasons [5]. The first is; exploiting
bugs in system software, since bugs relating to normal activity will be easily detected and
fixed. The second anomaly is due to carelessness of an attacker. A visible probe by a
careless attacker who is seeking information which normal users would already know is
the third reason. The fourth reason is deliberate insertion of unusual data to confuse the
IDS.
Effectiveness of an Intrusion Detection System also depends on the method of collecting
data [2]. Delayed detection and incorrect and incomplete data can all hamper the
performance of IDS.

1.3 Need for research
Intrusion Detection techniques are constantly evolving to keep pace with advances made
by attackers. Discoveries of new vulnerabilities also pressure this research. Although
various methods of detecting intrusion are employed each has its advantages and
disadvantages.
There are many challenges faced by today’s ID systems. Apart from technology specific
drawbacks, the common ones are
1.

Variants: an IDS must detect variations in attacks. While anomaly based
systems may detect such variations, misuse detection systems need a signature
before it can pinpoint certain activity as aberrant.

2.

False Positives: this is a case when legal traffic on a network is deemed as an
intrusion attempt. While an IDS plays a role of a sentry, it must not affect
legitimate users of the network.

5

3.

False Negatives are obtained when an IDS fails to detect an attack. A misuse
detection system can give false negatives for new attacks while an anomalybased system might miss detection if the attack is well disguised. False
Negatives defeat the purpose of IDS to a certain extent as it fails to prevent the
damage caused by an attack.

4.

Data Overload: IDS might also suffer from data overload. A key requirement
of an IDS is analyzing data in real time. If it does not process data fast enough,
there is every chance that it will allow some malicious traffic to pass
undetected.

1.4 False Alarm Rate
False Alarm Rate forms a part of false positives for an Intrusion Detection System. It is
inherent in every IDS. This is the case when an IDS triggers an alert when there is no
malicious activity. In environments where system security is a key issue, network
administrators monitor the systems round the clock. They have to investigate each alert
and make sure there is no breach of perimeters. Presence of large amount of false alarms
makes administration difficult and boring. The credibility of an IDS is thus compromised
[6]. The system administrator may develop a tendency to overlook certain alerts thinking
they are false. Although the false alarm rate can be reduced to an extent by tuning the
system, there is still a chance that such alarms will be generated. Developing new
techniques for detection can be one step towards improving the false alarm rate.
Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems can pose many problems, but False Alarms
are considered the greatest threat [7].
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1.5 Solution approach
In this thesis an attempt is made to explore the possibility of an additional parameter to
help detect Intrusions. This research will determine if there exists enough information in
this parameter so that it can be incorporated in current IDS solutions. Certain assumptions
are made before discussing the solution. The solution discussed here is devised based on
Anomaly Intrusion Detection as implemented in Snort [8]. For detecting anomalous
packets, snort uses a plugin called SPADE (Statistical Packet Anomaly Detection
Engine). This plugin determines if a packet is anomalous based on joint probabilities of
various header fields in a packet. Based on these probabilities, it calculates an anomaly
score, which triggers an alert if it exceeds a certain threshold. Clearly, the number of
parameters analyzed affects the decision making in an IDS. As a solution, network packet
data content can be classified, which could then be incorporated while calculating the
anomaly score. The payload content of a network packet varies by a large amount. There
are cases when packets have no payload (TCP syn packets) and cases when the payload
has malicious data (in an attack).
This thesis will try to classify the data within an E-mail attachment and try to relate it to a
specific type of file and identify patterns generated by different files. These patterns can
then hopefully be incorporated as one of the parameters used in Intrusion Detection
Systems.
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1.6 Design
The scope of this thesis will be limited to E-mail. Specific types of files having
extensions .exe, .dll, .doc, .jpg, .mp3, .pdf, .txt., will be classified based on the frequency
pattern they generate. Since E-mail is considered as the source of malicious activity, this
project will capture traffic on port 110 (POP). E-mail with known payloads will be sent to
a mail account. A standard POP mail account (Yahoo) will be used to receive the mail.
This mail will be downloaded to a mail client, Outlook Express. A packet sniffer
(ethereal) will be employed to capture data on the network as it is loaded to port 110.
The first step will be to isolate traffic on port 110. The response from a POP server can
be one of the following
1. TCP [SYN, ACK]
2. TCP [ACK]
3. Response: +OK hello
4. Response: +OK password required
5. Response: +OK maildrop ready
6. Response: +OK (Number) messages
7. New mail
8. Response: +OK server signing off
9. TCP [FIN, ACK]
Packets captured on port 110 will contain traffic corresponding all of the above
responses. Packets corresponding to the transfer of new mail to the client are isolated. In
this process, packets corresponding to SYN, ACK, authentication, message list are
ignored.
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Once packets corresponding to new mail which contain the attachment are isolated,
headers are stripped from the packet to obtain the payload. A frequency pattern is then
generated for this payload. Once patterns from different types of payload are obtained,
they are classified into different file types.

1.7 Conducting Experiments
The setup for the experiment is shown in the Figure 2. An e-mail client will be used to
send E-mail with an attachment to another client through a server. The receiving client
will download the E-mail using Outlook Express. This requires the use of POP protocol.
A packet sniffer will be deployed on the network in which the receiving client is
operating. The actual data payload of the attached file is then isolated and a pattern is
extracted from it.

Mail
Server

Sending
User

Packet
Sniffer

Mail Client
(Outlook)

Figure 2. Experiment Setup
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1.8 Analyzing Results
Once the packets corresponding to port 110 are captured, the payload of desired packets
(packets corresponding to the file attached to the mail) is isolated. An algorithm will be
employed to extract a pattern from the captured data. The analysis of these patterns will
determine whether these patterns can be used to differentiate traffic. If the patterns do
differ, then these patterns can be added as one more of the parameters that can be used for
Anomaly Intrusion Detection.

1.9 Reporting the Results
The analysis of patterns obtained can be used to recommend the use of payload of a
network packet in distinguishing good and bad network traffic. This will assist in
improving the overall performance of IDS.

1.10

Research objective

The objective of this research is to identify one such key parameter for use in Intrusion
Detection System. This then may generate a greater chance of detecting network abuses..
This research is to:
1.

Determine whether the payload of a network E-mail attachment packet can be
represented in a manner such that Intrusion Detection Systems can effectively
use it.

2.

Obtain data corresponding to specific attached file types as it is transferred
over a computer network.

3.

Identify patterns using this data.
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4.

Find a method to relate these patterns to the original data.
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Chapter 2

Previous Work
Existing Intrusion Detection Systems perform data collection and analysis using
monolithic architectures. A single module collects and analyzes data. This can be located
at a prime location just after the firewall [9] [10]. Several other networks which enable
distributed computing implement a different approach to network data collection and
analysis. These networks collect data from several modules distributed throughout the
network. Data collected from these modules is then transmitted to a central location
where it is processed [11] [12].

Every Intrusion Detection System must expect unknown attacks at some point of time. In
addition, they must also deal with finite failover resources. These resources which
include processors, memory can withstand an attack for a small time until the attack can
be detected. An IDS cannot survive any meaningful time unless the system can handle an
unknown attack in the initial stages [13].

Detecting system vulnerabilities requires a lot of computation and manpower. This costs
time and money. Extensive testing must be employed to find these vulnerabilities. But
once these vulnerabilities are found, they are exploitable. Successive attacks can be
launched in a small amount of time. Unfortunately, stealthy attacks do not execute
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unauthorized processes, write unauthorized files or consume a lot of resources including
CPU or memory [14]. Detecting such new or stealthy attacks is a very difficult task.
Hopefully, E-mail attachment monitoring as proposed here can have a beneficial effect.
Considerable effort has been expended to determine network traffic based on the data
content. Emphasis to date has been on built-in inter-sample behavior, where an attempt is
made to relate different packets in order to determine their intent. This is done using
frequency domain analysis of sampled data [15].

Another problem faced by an Intrusion Detection System is the amount of data which is
analyzed. Most Intrusion Detection Systems detect intrusions based on headers of
network packets. Many times this information is insufficient to reconstruct network
activity which in turn affects the accuracy if the IDS [16].

Data mining techniques have also been used to gather audit data. Data mining models the
behavior of intrusions and of normal activities [17]. The data thus obtained can also be
combined to construct a picture of the total impact on a system.

Typically, an IDS uses packet headers from the network and transport layers to detect
intrusions. This technique might improve IDS performance by filtering out malformed
packets at the router level [18].

Systems that analyze application payloads are still evolving. Variations in payload
content of a network packet are very high. Hence, processing of the packet payload
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requires some information about the application [19]. In such a process, network traffic is
partitioned depending on the application and then analyzed. Thus, setting a baseline for
normal traffic specific to a certain service.

Efforts have also been made to create a graph based Intrusion Detection System [20]. In
such a system, the network activity is depicted graphically to help recognize large-scale
attacks more efficiently. A large scale attack may not otherwise provide sufficient
information to trigger an alert. Collecting and analyzing data from several thousand hosts
is very difficult. Graphs which represent network traffic activity can ordinarily be useful
in fast detection of large scale attacks.

Gathering information to supply an Intrusion Detection System has always been a
challenge. Information is generally gathered from the data stream by sampling, filtering
and approximation. A novel approach uses a summary of data obtained as a “sketch”
[21]. These “sketches”, which are obtained at distributed locations, are used to find
features in network data. The advantages described include, small size, distributed
collection and quick analysis.
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Chapter 3

Anatomy of E-mail
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is used to communicate between two users using
plain text ASCII characters. It is independent of any transmission subsystem and requires
a reliable data channel [22]. The SMTP communication model is shown in Figure 3.
Communication in SMTP takes place in the following manner. Sender-SMTP and
receiver-SMTP establish a communication channel. The sender then sends a MAIL
command for which the receiver replies with an OK if it accepts mail. The sender then
sends a RCPT command identifying the recipient of the mail. If the receiver can accept
mail for this recipient, it replies with an OK. Once the recipients are negotiated, the
sender sends the mail data. On receiving the data successfully, the receiver will send an
OK reply.

Depending on systems, the format in which these messages are stored might differ.
However process of communication of messages between two hosts follows a fixed
format [23]. The message format is made up of an envelope and contents. The envelope
is responsible for transmission and delivery while the contents consist of the object to be
delivered. The message consists of lines of ASCII text with no provisions for drawings,
facsimile, speech or structured text.
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User
File
system

SMTP
commands/
replies and
mail
SenderSMTP

ReceiverSMTP
File
system
Receiver SMTP

Sender SMTP

Figure 3. SMTP Communication Model

3.1 Sending Attachments
This technique for sending E-mail caters to simple ASCII text communication only [23]
and leaves no provision for multi-part textual and non-textual message bodies. This
information must still be communicated within the message body. Limitations of RFC
822 mail are also evident while communicating between RFC 822 hosts and X.400 hosts
[24], as X.400 includes non-textual body parts within mail. Non-textual body parts within
RFC 822 mail must be discarded which results in loss of information. Additional
specifications for representing and exchanging non-ASCII data without loss of
information are described in RFC 1521 [24]. RFC 1521 suggests methods by which
messages in non-ASCII character sets, formatted multi-font text and non textual material
like images, audio fragments, can be represented as textual messages which can be sent
via E-mail. The process does not extend E-mail headers to be non-ASCII text data. The
mechanisms described in [24] for sending non-textual messages include –
1. MIME-version header: declares conformance with specifications.
2. Content-type header field: specifies type and sub-type of data in message body.
3. Content-transfer-encoding field: specifies encoding that was applied to the data.
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4. Two additional header fields to describe data. Content-ID and ContentDescription header field.

3.2 MIME
MIME stands for Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions. MIME provides extensible
solution to send various types of data as 7-bit ASCII [25]. MIME creates a header using
low-order ASCII characters. It then wraps this header around the attachment and encodes
the attachment. The format of a MIME encoded attachment is shown in Figure 4. The
message is delimited by the boundary ID at the beginning and end. The contents of the
attachment are defined by a series of headers. The headers identify attachment type,
original filename, encoding mechanism.

Figure 4. MIME format

--Boundary_(ID_g1Gepa0UrzY13XI9WaOapg)
Content-type: application/pdf; name="UG-Research Comp-WV-EPSCoR.pdf"
Content-transfer-encoding: base64
Content-disposition: attachment; filename="UG-Research Comp-WV-EPSCoR.pdf"

JVBERi0xLjIKJSDi48/TCiAKMTggMCBvYmogPDwg………………

--Boundary_(ID_g1Gepa0UrzY13XI9WaOapg)--
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3.2.1 Content-Transfer-Encoding header field
RFC 821 [22] restricts mail messages to 7 bit US ACII data. Content types like 8 bit
character or binary data cannot be transmitted over SMTP. To send such files as part of
E-mail, they must be encoded as plain text ASCII. Content-Transfer-Encoding describes
invertible mapping of data. This mapping could then be exchanged with mail transfer
protocol. The mechanisms described in [24] are
1. 7bit
2. quoted-printable
3. base-64
4. 8bit
5. binary
6. x-token
Content-Transfer-Encoding appearing in the message header applies to the entire
message body, while Content-Transfer-Encoding applies to a part of the body if it
appears in the body of the message. Since E-mails are character oriented, the above
mechanisms will convert arbitrary octet streams and not bit streams. To represent bit
streams, they must first be converted to 8-bit byte streams. RFC 1521 [24] also describes
two standard Content-Transfer-Encoding types as
1. quoted-printable: represents data corresponding to printable characters in ASCII
code. The encoding is such that mail transport systems are unlikely to modify the
data and hence integrity is maintained.
2. base 64 encoding: represents arbitrary sequence of octets in human readable form.
(see section 3.2.2)
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Converting data to ASCII so that it can be sent via mail can also be done using
UUencode. UUencode uses low-order ASCII characters to convert complex data to be
sent over the communication channel. The receiver then decodes this message to obtain
the original file.

3.2.2 Base64 Encoding
BASE 64 encoding is used to convert non-ASCII files into 7-bit ASCII. It uses a 65character subset of US-ASCII in which 6 bits represent a printable character. The
algorithm for converting any arbitrary sequence to base64 involves grouping 24 bits from
the input to represent four encoded characters. The group of 24 bits is obtained by
concatenating three 8-bit groups. This group in turn is assumed as a concatenation of four
6-bit groups. Each 6-bit group is then translated to a character as identified in Table 1.
The decoder ignores characters, which do not belong to the table. The encoded output
stream is represented in a line of 76 characters or less. Special characters (like “.”, CR,
LF), which are specified for SMTP, are omitted from this table.

In case, the input data stream is not a multiple of 24 bits, zero bits are added on the right
of the data stream to form an integral 6-bit group. A 65th character given as ‘=’ is used for
the purpose of padding. The input for base64 encoder is always an integral multiple of an
octet. Hence, three cases are possible:
1. Final quantum is integral multiple of 24 bits – no padding necessary.
2. Final quantum is 8-bits long – two padding characters ‘=’ are added.
3. Final quantum is 16-bits long – one padding character ‘=’ is added.
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Padding characters also indicate the end of data. More than two padding characters at the
end of message are considered illegal.

Table 1: The Base64 Alphabet
Value

Encoding

Value

Encoding

Value

Encoding

Value

Encoding

0

A

17

R

34

I

51

z

1

B

18

S

35

j

52

0

2

C

19

T

36

k

53

1

3

D

20

U

37

l

54

2

4

E

21

V

38

m

55

3

5

F

22

W

39

n

56

4

6

G

23

X

40

o

57

5

7

H

24

Y

41

p

58

6

8

I

25

Z

42

q

59

7

9

J

26

a

43

r

60

8

10

K

27

b

44

s

61

9

11

L

28

c

45

t

62

+

12

M

29

d

46

u

63

/

13

N

30

e

47

v

14

O

31

f

48

w

(pad)

=

15

P

32

g

49

x

16

Q

33

h

50

y
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Chapter 4

Configuration of the Experiment
For the purpose of determining a pattern from network data, a small subset of traffic
present on a computer network is considered (E-mail attachments). Two known clients
are used to generate required traffic. Both the clients communicate with a mail server.
The principle function of client one is to send mails to client two with a known payload.
Client two will receive these E-mails which provide necessary data for analysis. Client
two belongs to a network where a packet sniffer is placed in promiscuous node to capture
the network traffic. For the purpose of capturing packets, an open source Network
Protocol Analyzer, Ethereal was used. Filters are set on the sniffer such that only packets
corresponding to port 110 are captured. The captured packets are saved as raw data
(libpcap format) for further analysis.

The format of these captured packets is given in Figure 5. Since filters are used on the
packet sniffer, only those packets, which have a source port of 110 (POP) are captured.
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4.1 Algorithm
The following steps were used to obtain a pattern from the captured packets.
1. Capture packets using a network sniffer (ethereal).
1. Set filters on the sniffer so that it will capture traffic with source port 110 (POP).
2. Isolate traffic corresponding to e-mail attachment from captured packets.
(Captured packets will also contain other POP communication like SYN, SYNACK, authentication, message list, FIN, etc)
3. For every packet that corresponds to the attachment, determine the frequency of
the Base64 alphabets.
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4.2 Test Data
Seven types of files will be sent as attachments with E-mail. These types are binary
executable (.exe), dynamically linked library (.dll), audio (.mp3), MS word document
(.doc), image file (.jpg), Adobe Acrobat PDF file (.pdf) and plaintext file (.txt). These
files are selected from random locations and vary in size.
A single captured packet contains the following fields.
1. Frame header – has a length of 12 bytes. This field indicates frame number,
arrival time, packet length and captured length.
2. Ethernet header – has a length of 14 bytes. Contains source and destination
Ethernet address as well as a type field, which indicated underlying network layer
protocol.
3. IP header – as we are capturing packets on port 110, all the packets correspond to
IP. Hence the Ethernet header is followed by the IP header, which indicates
source, destination IP address, various flags, underlying protocol, packet length,
etc.
4. TCP header – this field indicates source and destination port, sequence number,
acknowledgement number.
5. Payload – this field contains the payload of the network packet. There is no
payload in case the packet is a SYN or ACK. The payload also varies depending
upon data exchange. Thus, it may contain authentication information, list of
messages, new messages, etc.
6. CRC checksum – this field is part of the Ethernet header and indicates whether
data is corrupted during transport.
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Figure 5. Captured Packet Data Structure

Frame Header: 12 bytes.
Ethernet Header: 14 bytes

IP Header: 20 bytes
TCP Header: 20 bytes
Payload: (0 – 1460 bytes)

Ethernet CRC check: 4 bytes
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Table 2 shows the details of the data which is used for the experiment. The seven types of
files used for the experiment varied in size as shown in table 2. Ten files of each type
were used. Since the Maximum Transfer Unit is 1500 bytes, the number of packets
generated by each file attachment varied from 2 packets for the smallest text file (2KB) to
3339 packets for the largest audio file (4874KB). Table 3 shows this number of packets
which were generated by the files selected for the experiment. I believe the number of
packets analyzed to obtain a frequency pattern is statistically sufficient.
Table 2: Range of File Size
File Type

File size (KB)
Minimum

Maximum

.exe

17

533

.dll

15

569

.pdf

56

571

.doc

23

315

.txt

2

552

.mp3

16

4874

.jpg

38

438

Table 3: Number of Packets Generated
File Type

Total File Size

Number of Packets

exe

1502

1029

dll

1003

687

pdf

2230

1528

doc

987

677

txt

1091

748

mp3

21126

14470

jpg

1502

1029
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4.3 Isolating the E-mail attachment
The next step is to isolate the e-mail attachment. For this purpose, we determine all types
of packets that were captured. The following types of packets were identified.
1. TCP [SYN, ACK]
2. TCP [ACK]
3. Response: +OK hello
4. Response: +OK password required
5. Response: +OK maildrop ready
6. Response: +OK (Number) messages
7. New mail
8. Response: +OK server signing off
9. TCP [FIN, ACK]
The packets corresponding to New Mail are the ones of interest. These packets can be
identified from the response in the payload.
Once these packets are isolated, the frequency of the data will be found. For this purpose,
samples of 8 bits are considered. These samples are 7 bit ASCII characters with the MSB
set to 0. The length of a single packet is limited to 1460 bytes due to limitations on
Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU). The frequency of a particular character is found as the
number of occurrences of the character in the given packet.
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Chapter 5

Observations
From the experiments, it can be confirmed that distribution of data is limited to USASCII character range. Within this range, there are three distinct groups. These three
groups can be identified as
1. Group 1 - Sample value 48 – 57: corresponding to 0 – 9 in ASCII table
2. Group 2 - Sample value 65 – 90: corresponding to characters A – Z in ASCII
table and
3. Group 3 - Sample value 97 – 122: corresponding to characters a – z in ASCII
table.
Apart from these three groups, two characters CR (ASCII 0x0a, Sample value 10) and LF
(ASCII 0x0d, Sample value 13) are found to occur at a regular frequency. This is due to
the fact that every mail server has a line length limit of 76 characters. While transmitting
an encoded file, a new line character is introduced so that the encoded message conforms
to standards.
For a packet of size 1500 bytes, the frequency of CR and LF was observed to be 23 to 24.

Figures 6 through 19 show the frequency distributions for the seven types of files that
were considered. A distinct difference in the frequency distributions of all the seven types
can be seen.
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Compared to the standard occurrence of CR/LF character (23 to 24 times per packet), the
variation in frequencies of characters is very high for an application or a dll file (above
200 for Application and above 150 for dll at sample value 65). The peak frequency was
highest for a word document at 1070. For other file formats the peak frequency was
observed in the range 30 – 80 for the same frequency of CR/LF (23 or 24).

Figure 6 shows the frequency distribution for 20 packets of an E-mail attachment of an
executable (.exe). It can be seen that the variations in peaks for the three groups are
similar. Sample value 65 has the peak frequency. Sample value 47 has the peak frequency
in group 2 while group 3 has no specific sample with the consistent peak frequency.
Variation in frequency is more in groups 1 and 2 while it is less in group 3. Table 3
confirms this observation as the standard deviation for the three groups is 25.6, 37 and
8.53 respectively. Figure 7 shows a profile of a single packet.

28

29

Figure 8 shows a sample frequency distribution for a packet corresponding to a .dll file.
Here we observe that the frequency response is similar to that of an application but the
peak

values

of

frequencies

are

lower.

30

Figure

9 shows

a

single

packet.
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Figure 10 and 11 show the frequency distribution for a word document (.doc). it can be
seen that the frequency corresponding to sample value 65 is much higher. Table 3
confirms that the standard deviation for group 3 is 209. There are very few samples in
group 3.
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Frequency distribution for a pdf file is shown in figures 12 and 13. The peak frequency
for pdf file is closer to CR/LF frequency. It is also observed that variation in frequencies
for the three groups in case of a pdf file is minimum. This can be confirmed from Table
3.
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For a text file, the peak value of frequency ranges between 50 and 80. However variation
in frequency within a group is more. The values of standard deviation of frequency for a
text file for the three groups are 11.3, 10.7 and 12.5.
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Figures 16 and 17 show frequency distributions for an image (jpg) file. The values of
standard deviation are uniform for all the three groups.
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s.
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Figures 18 and 19 show frequency distributions for audio (mp3) files. In this case, group
2 has slightly higher values for frequency compared to groups 1 and 3. Standard
deviation for group 2 is higher than standard deviation for groups 1 and 3.
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Figures 20 and 21 show frequency distributions for a pdf file in Russian language while it
is observed that compared to the frequency distribution of other (exe, dll, mp3, jpg, etc)
file types, the frequency distribution of the pdf file in Russian language is much closer to
the pdf file in English language (Figure 12). The current format of E-mail communication
requires all the attachments to be encoded using base64 or similar algorithm. This means
that pure ASCII text files are also encoded before attached to an E-mail. This technique
ensures that the data sent through an E-mail depends on file type and not on the language.
Hence, it is observed that packets corresponding to English text files do not follow the
frequency of the English text.
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Table 4 shows the comparison of average frequencies of groups 1, 2 and 3 for all seven
types of files. Figure 22 represents observations of table 2 graphically. It can be observed
that the average frequencies for file types .exe and .dll are similar. Average frequencies
for all three groups are almost same for a .pdf file while the frequencies for image and
audio file types are similar. Average frequency of group 2 for a .doc file is much higher
than frequency of group 1 or 3.
Table 4: Average frequencies of the three groups
File extensions
Exe
Dll
Pdf
Doc
Txt
mp3
Jpg

Average frequency
Group 2
30.7
29.4
21.6
45.7
24.6
24.1
23.6

Group 1
23.4
23
21.9
8.04
13.1
19.5
20.2
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Group 3
13.2
14.5
22.5
2.46
19.3
21.3
21.4

Table 5 shows standard deviation of frequencies of the three groups for all types of files.
Figure 23 represents the results graphically. Standard deviation of group 2 frequency of
.doc file is the highest. Standard deviation for all three groups of file types .exe and .dll is
similar to corresponding group while standard deviation for all three groups is same for
.pdf, .txt and .jpg. Standard deviation is the lowest for all three groups of .pdf file type.

Table 5: Standard deviation of frequencies of the three groups
Standard deviation
Group 2
37
29.5
0.93
209
10.7
6.64
3.14

File extensions
Exe
Dll
Pdf
Doc
Txt
mp3
Jpg

Group 1
25.6
19.3
1.24
20
11.3
1.6
2.68
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Group 3
8.53
8.22
1.29
2.29
12.5
1.82
3.38

Table 6 shows the maximum and minimum value of frequency for each group of the
seven file types. Figure 24 shows the same results graphically.

Table 6: Maximum and minimum frequencies
File
extensions
exe
dll
pdf
doc
txt
mp3
jpg

Group 1
Max
Min
97.3
4.76
77.9
6.7
24.4
20.2
68.2
0.81
33.4
0
21.8
16.9
24.3
17.6

Group 2
Max
Min
199
5.05
162
4.25
23.7
20
1070
0.69
45.6
3.9
54.7
17.1
30.3
16.2
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Group 3
Max
Min
39.1
2.48
33.3
3
24.4
18.8
9.88
0.69
52.1
0.1
25.5
18.5
27.6
15.6

Chapter 6

Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
There exist sufficient cases to distinguish packet data based on the frequency pattern
generated by it. The pattern obtained from the E-mail attachment is restricted to three
principle groups since E-mail attachments use Base64 alphabets. The three zones
correspond to the ranges 0-9, A-Z, a-z in the ASCII table. The frequency distribution of
data for these three zones corresponds to the file type that is transmitted. This frequency
can be compared with the occurrence of CR, LF characters.
A file type can be identified by the frequency pattern it generates. Parameters like peak
frequencies, relative distribution of frequencies and standard deviations of a network
packet can be used to classify file types. Classification of files in this manner requires no
information from the packet headers, which may serve as an advantage if a packet is
spoofed.
For the seven types of files that were considered, difference in pattern for .pdf, .doc, .txt,
.mp3 and .jpg was clearly found. The pattern for .exe and .dll was similar to a large
extent. The values of standard deviation and minimum and maximum frequencies were
also similar. Based on the parameters considered for finding the difference, these two file
types could not be clearly differentiated.
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6.2 Future Work
Pattern recognition can be applied to network packet data without having to know the
header contents. The work described here identifies files attached to E-mails. The same
principle could be extended to traffic on other ports. This could be applied to identify
normal and anomalous traffic on such ports.
E-mails restrict network traffic to US-ASCII characters. Communication on other ports
could contain more complex data types. It would be interesting to know what kind of
pattern will be generated if the data is not limited to ASCII character set.
The current implementation is an attempt to classify traffic based on data content. The
next step would be to apply this principle to detect and classify traffic in real time.
Because capturing and analyzing network traffic data in real time is a time consuming
task, it would be interesting to see if it can applied in real time.
Efforts can be made to explore classification methods other than the one described in this
thesis. For this purpose, advanced statistical methods or neural networks can also be
employed.
An assumption was made regarding the statistical significance of the number of packets
analyzed in making a decision about pattern related to an application. Exploration in this
direction needs to be done to establish the minimum number of packets required for such
analysis.
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Appendix 1: Base64 Encoding
Suppose a binary sequence is to be transmitted through e-mail. A 24 bit sample of this
sequence is given as
100110111010001011101001
In byte format (decimal values) this sequence represents
155

162

233

On dividing this sample into four characters of 6 bits, we get the sequence
100110

111010

001011

101001

which correspond to decimal values
38

58

11

41

using the base64 alphabet from Table 1, these numbers are represented as
m

6

L

P

the final message will be sent as 7-bit ASCII where the above characters are sent using
the ASCII table of Appendix 2.
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Appendix 2: US ASCII Chart
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Appendix 3: Program for generating pattern from
packet data
/*
Title: Program for generating pattern from Email attachment
Filename: classification.cpp
Date: 3/15/04
Author: Archis Raje
Language: C++
Compiler: Microsoft Visual C++
Version: 6.0
Program Description: The following program is used to find the frequency of data
in a network packet which corresponds to an E-mail. The program reads from a
file where captured network packet data is stored. This captured data
corresponds to traffic on port 110 (POP). The following program isolates
packets which represent an E-mail attachment and proceeds to find frequency
of data in these packets.
Execution Command:
C:\>classification <sp> filename
where filename is the name of the file containing captured data.
the captured data must be in libpcap format (.cap)
Output expected: The program generates an output file by the name Frequency.csv
This output file has Microsoft Excel Comma Separated Value (.csv) format
The data stored in this file is arranged in rows and columns
A single row corresponds to a single network packet while columns correspond
to values from 0 to 130 (sufficient to cover the base64 alphabets)
*/
#include<iostream.h>
#include<stdio.h>
#include<stdlib.h>
#include<fstream.h>
void main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
FILE *output_file;
unsigned int frequency[1000][130] = {0};
unsigned char * buff;
const char * filename = argv[1];
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int i, j = 0, k;
int next_packet = 40;
int start_packet = 40;
int packet_length = 0;
int tcp_hdr_length = 0;
int start_tcp_data = 0;
long size;
int packet = 1;

// beginning of ethernet header of next packet
// point where ethernet header starts
// length of TCP + IP headers and payload
// for cases when TCP header size > 20 bytes
// point where payload starts

bool DATA;
// beginning of paylaod
bool start_data(int start_tcp_data, unsigned char * buff);
// following block does initial file operations. the file specified in program
// argument is opened for reading. the total file size is found and the entire
// contents are read into a buffer.
ifstream file (filename, ios::in|ios::binary|ios::ate);
size = file.tellg();
file.seekg (0, ios::beg);
buff = new unsigned char [size];
file.read (buff, size);
file.close();
// this while loop covers one single packet.
while(next_packet < size)
{
packet_length = (int)buff[start_packet + 16]*256 + (int)buff[start_packet
+ 17]; // first the total length of current packet is found
next_packet += (packet_length + 30);
// position of next packet is
noted.
tcp_hdr_length = ((int)buff[start_packet + 46] >> 4) * 4; // finds the
exact TCP header lenght as it may vary
start_tcp_data = start_packet + 34 + tcp_hdr_length; // determine the
beginning of the packet payload
if((next_packet - start_tcp_data) > 16)
// proceed only if the packet
is not empty. If the packet is empty, we proceed to next packet.
{
DATA = start_data(start_tcp_data, buff);
// determine if the
current packet belongs to the attachment of Email
if(DATA)
// continue if the packet corresponds to Email
attachment
{
while(1)
{
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start_packet = next_packet; // initialize next
packet. as this will be the packet where data corresponding to the attachment will begin.
packet++;
// find packet length, position of nect packet, TCP
header length and beginning of next packet.
packet_length = (int)buff[start_packet + 16]*256 +
(int)buff[start_packet + 17];
next_packet += (packet_length + 30);
tcp_hdr_length = ((int)buff[start_packet + 46] >> 4)
* 4;
start_tcp_data = start_packet + 34 + tcp_hdr_length;
// exit from the loop if the packets corresponding to
the attachment are finished
if(buff[start_tcp_data + 1] == 0x4f &&
buff[start_tcp_data + 2] == 0x4b)
break;
// traverse through payload of a single network
packet and determine the frequency of sample values corresponding to base64 alphabet.
for(i=start_tcp_data;i<(next_packet-16);i++)
for(i=0;i<size;i++)
frequency[j][buff[i]]++;
j++; // increment packet counter
}
}
}
start_packet = next_packet; // set start of next packet in the file
packet++;
// increment packet counter.
}
output_file = fopen("frequency.csv","w");

// open output file to store data

// the first 'for' loop corresponds to a single packet sample.
for(i=0;i<j;i++)
{
// the second 'for' loop corresponds to all the base64 alphabets in a single
packet
for(k=0;k<130;k++)
{
fprintf(output_file, "%d", frequency[i][k]);
fputc(44,output_file); // a single character corresponding to "," is
inserted to separate each sample frequency.
}
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fputc(13,output_file); // a single character corresponding to "line feed" is
inserted to separate data for each single packet.
}
fclose(output_file); // close the output file
}
// following function determines whether the current packet is the beginning of
// an attachment or part of other POP communication. the function returns 'true'
// if the packet corresponds to attachment. else it returns a false.
bool start_data(int start_tcp_data, unsigned char * buff)
{
if(buff[start_tcp_data + 1] == 0x4f && buff[start_tcp_data + 2] == 0x4b)
{
if((buff[start_tcp_data + 16] == 0x0d && buff[start_tcp_data + 17] ==
0x0a) ||
(buff[start_tcp_data + 17] == 0x0d && buff[start_tcp_data + 18]
== 0x0a) ||
(buff[start_tcp_data + 18] == 0x0d && buff[start_tcp_data + 19]
== 0x0a))
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
else
return 0;
}
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